Skip to content
SHC Docs

SSO auto-redirect: the arming plan

Status: open design. This is the per-app arming plan. Which apps on its list have since been armed is not recorded here. No estate was contacted in writing it: every value below is read out of the packages on main, out of ce’s resolver, or out of the read-only live audit of 2026-08-10 (docs/handoff/2026-08-10-ssoautoredirect-arming-audit.md), which is cited wherever a claim rests on a live measurement rather than on source.

What this is for. The owner has hit five apps in a row whose login page shows an SSO button instead of redirecting (wazuh, penpot, ciso-assistant, dependency-track, highlight) plus frappe, which turned out to be working. This document replaces those five separate decisions with one.


0. What changed underneath this, and why the decision is now possible

Section titled “0. What changed underneath this, and why the decision is now possible”

Until 2026-08-11 the documented operator surface armed almost nothing. shc config set ssoAutoRedirect true was read in exactly one place in ce (modules/app/ingress_materialize.go) and reached only the six apps declaring an app.yaml sso_redirect: block. The ~16 apps that implement auto-redirect natively read a per-app var (keycloak.autoRedirect, keycloak.makeDefault, oidcOnly, ssoOnly) from their own compose template, and ce’s compose render context carried no config value of any kind, so the documented key could not reach them even in principle. It failed silently.

Landed on both mains today:

repocommitwhat it does
ce7112971resolves the decision once and publishes one resolved bool, sso_auto_redirect, into both surfaces an app package can reach: renderCtx (compose + hook jobs) and tmplCtx (consumer plug post_deployment jobs)
shc59ecac10feleven packages now gate on vars.<knob> or sso_auto_redirect; five that would lock an estate out deliberately do not

Three properties of that change are load-bearing for everything below.

  1. Precedence is additive, not override: vars.<knob> or sso_auto_redirect. Either surface arms; neither disarms the other. The alternative (“var overrides key”) is unimplementable, because every catalogue vars.yaml ships its knob false; a deliberate false is byte-identical to an untouched default, so the packaged default would beat the operator’s intent, always. The way to exempt one deployment from a fleet-wide flip is therefore a config row at deployment scope, not a var.
  2. The or <name> form, never the bare name. A jinja {% if %} over an undefined name drops its branch silently, so a template gating only on the new name would render “off” on any older daemon, unarmable by any surface, which is strictly worse than the defect. Verified during landing, for both the block form and the inline {{ … if … else … }} form windmill’s init job uses: with the name absent, the or spelling renders exactly as before and collects zero missing refs (an older daemon would otherwise refuse the install with X500047CMPRND). A bare name renders “off” even when the var is true. The catalogue is safe ahead of a ce pin bump; shc’s go.mod still pins ce 6a3dcc5 and does not need to move for this.
  3. No config.* namespace was exposed. core/config/default.yaml holds backup.password, backup.aws_secret_access_key, vault.providers.*.token, smtp.password and per-provider DNS tokens, and app packages are registry artifacts re-rendered by whatever daemon installs them. A whole-tree exposure would let any package emit the estate’s restic password. What ships is one bool naming a decision, guarded by an exact-set assertion in ce/modules/app/sso_autoredirect_render_surface_test.go so that widening it fails a test rather than a production estate.

Set ssoAutoRedirect true at global scope on both estates, after the two pre-flight cleanups in §5.

That arms bucket A only. Bucket B is structurally unreachable from this key (guarded by a differential render test, §3). Bucket C has no mechanism to arm (§4).

Live blast radius is smaller than the catalogue suggests. Most bucket-A apps are not deployed on either estate. The flip changes behaviour on five live deployments today; the rest is future installs.


2. Bucket A: SAFE TO ARM (has a verified local-login bypass)

Section titled “2. Bucket A: SAFE TO ARM (has a verified local-login bypass)”

An entry belongs here only if the escape URL is verified against package evidence. That URL is what makes arming reversible during a Keycloak outage; without one, an entry belongs in bucket B.

A1: native-knob apps (the eleven newly unified)

Section titled “A1: native-knob apps (the eleven newly unified)”
AppKnobEscape URLEvidenceDeployed
gitlabkeycloak.autoRedirect/users/sign_in?auto_sign_in=falseapps/devops/gitlab/compose.yaml:332 (gate :324)both estates
ciso-assistantkeycloak.autoRedirect/login?local=1, any non-empty query stringapps/security/ciso-assistant/compose.yaml:383-388; the Caddy matcher fires only on {http.request.uri.query} == ""both estates
nextcloudkeycloak.autoRedirect<basePath>/login?direct=1apps/collaboration/nextcloud/oidc.plug.yaml:723-725,751bitspur
librechatkeycloak.autoRedirect/login?redirect=falseapps/ai/librechat/compose.yaml:247-251 (ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN stays true)none
paperlesskeycloak.autoRedirect/accounts/login/?loggedout=1apps/documents/paperless/compose.yaml:172-175none
immichkeycloak.autoRedirect/auth/login?autoLaunch=0apps/media/immich/oidc.plug.yaml:63-66none
defectdojo-classickeycloak.autoRedirect/login?force_login_formapps/security/defectdojo-classic/compose.yaml:118-121none
midpointkeycloak.makeDefault<base>/midpoint/auth/defaultapps/security/midpoint/compose.yaml:604,672-675none
midpoint-classickeycloak.makeDefault<base>/midpoint/auth/defaultapps/security/midpoint-classic/compose.yaml:604,672-675none
⚠ wordpresskeycloak.autoRedirect/wp-login.php?login-error=1apps/cms/wordpress/compose.yaml:60-67none

⚠ wordpress is a half-bypass and should be treated as bucket B until fixed. The page renders, then the plugin strips the credential form with JavaScript; recovery needs a browser with JS disabled (the credential POST itself is never intercepted). It is listed here because its knob is wired to the key, not because the escape hatch is sound. If the owner wants a clean fleet-wide yes, set ssoAutoRedirect false at wordpress’s stack scope as part of the arming change; there is no wordpress on either estate today, so this is a catalogue-hygiene item, not an outage risk.

A2: sso_redirect: router apps (already answered the key; unchanged)

Section titled “A2: sso_redirect: router apps (already answered the key; unchanged)”

Six apps take auto-redirect at the Traefik edge. They have always read this key. ce’s rule carries a !Query(sso,false) clause, so every one of them has the same escape hatch, ?sso=false: defaultSSOBypassQuery at ce/modules/app/sso_redirect.go:73, rendered at :471-474 and :817-820. No app in the catalogue overrides bypass_query:.

AppEscape URLDeployed / armed today
frappe/login?sso=falsebitspur ×3 (ffx, bit, erpnext), already armed at deployment scope
huly/login?sso=falseboth estates, already armed at stack scope
windmill/user/login?sso=falseboth estates, already armed at stack scope
affine-rs/sign-in?sso=falseboth estates, already armed at deployment scope
affine/sign-in?sso=falsearmed but inert (down on bitspur; orphan dir on promanager)
kutt/login?sso=falsenone

★ windmill is the one app under both mechanisms, and its two bypasses are not interchangeable. Windmill’s own ?no_sso=1 is read in the browser and is therefore defeated by an edge 302 that fires before any HTML is delivered. Measured on both estates 2026-08-10: ?no_sso=1 → 302, ?sso=false → 200. Document ?sso=false; documenting ?no_sso=1 is a lockout instruction. A bats guard asserts the description names ?sso=false first (apps/automation/windmill/tests/tests.bats:776-779).

★ frappe’s ?sso=false reaches the login page on all three installs, but whether a password form renders is per-site. disable_user_pass_login is 0 on erp.corp.bitspur.com ✔, 1 on hq.corp.bitspur.com ✘ and hq.flyingfoxlabs.in ✘. Pre-existing, detected by login-path-audit.job.yaml (G8), unrelated to this flip, but it means two of three frappe sites have no credential door regardless of what this key says.

Logout behaviour is a separate axis, and it bites

Section titled “Logout behaviour is a separate axis, and it bites”

On gitlab, frappe, huly, affine, ciso-assistant, defectdojo-classic a logout does not end the Keycloak session, so signing out signs the user straight back in. On those apps the escape URL doubles as the only way to actually stay logged out. gitlab is the exception that already handles it: its after_sign_out_path companion is set outside the autoRedirect block (apps/devops/gitlab/compose.yaml:363, inside {% if integrations.oidc %} at :339) and is deliberately not conditioned on the knob, so federated sign-out is already on whenever OIDC is bound.


3. Bucket B: NO BYPASS. Arming risks total lockout.

Section titled “3. Bucket B: NO BYPASS. Arming risks total lockout.”

Leave these for a separate, explicitly-consented decision.

Five apps. All five declare local_login.closed_by: in their own app.yaml, the same declaration ce’s post-restore usable-login check reads (ce/modules/app/login_path_postcheck.go:121-122,171,323,336 → X200042NOLOGIN). The catalogue guard derives the exclusion from that declaration rather than from a hand-maintained list.

AppKnobWhat the knob actually doesBypass
giteakeycloak.autoRedirectsets ENABLE_PASSWORD_SIGNIN_FORM: falsenone at 1.27.1; recovery needs shell access to redeploy
wazuhkeycloak.autoRedirectnames openid the dashboard’s sole auth type, deleting the password formnone
matrixkeycloak.autoRedirectflips MAS passwords.enabled: false; Synapse password auth is already force-closed for MAS delegationnone
journivoidcOnlydisables password login outrightnone
vaultwardenssoOnlydisables password login outrightnone

★ journiv and vaultwarden are not redirect knobs at all. oidcOnly and ssoOnly do not redirect anything; their entire effect is removing the credential login form, and both render unconditionally (gated_on_edge: false), so they close the door with or without a bound IdP. Collapsing them into a fleet-wide “auto-redirect” would strand every local admin on every deployment, for a setting that never had “redirect” in its meaning. That is why they are excluded, and it is a different reason from gitea/wazuh/matrix, where the redirect is the removal of the form.

They stay per-deployment --var, and that is the recommendation. A fleet-wide redirect preference must never make a fleet-wide lockout decision. If the owner does want any of these armed, it should be one named deployment at a time, with the recovery path rehearsed first.

This is enforced, not documented. tests/unit/catalog/sso_unified_surface_test.go:377 (TestTheScopedKeyNeverClosesADeclaredDoor) is a differential render test: for every app declaring local_login.closed_by, the render under ssoAutoRedirect true must be byte-identical to the render with both surfaces off, and the --var must still change it (so exclusion never becomes deafness to both surfaces). It fails loudly if the corpus is empty, the failure mode this project has already shipped once.


4. Bucket C: CANNOT. Structural, with the failing author check named.

Section titled “4. Bucket C: CANNOT. Structural, with the failing author check named.”

These apps have no auto-redirect mechanism to arm. The flip is a strict no-op for them; they are listed so the owner knows the button is not coming back for them without work.

AppFailing checkDetail
penpotchecks 1 and 2GET /api/rpc/command/login-with-oidc → 405, POST-only; and its login page is the SPA fragment /#/auth/login, which is never transmitted to the server, so no PathRegexp can see it. Pinned: tests/unit/catalog/sso_redirect_audit_test.go:316-336
dependency-trackcheck 2browser-minted PKCE: discovery and code_challenge are built in the browser, the verifier never leaves browser storage, redirect_uri=https://<host>/static/oidc-callback.html. The selector form cannot help either: the shell has zero anchors (the button is a Vue component). Measured 2026-08-09 in Chromium; apps/security/dependency-track/app.yaml:110-157, pinned at sso_redirect_audit_test.go:281-315
vaultwardencheck 2browser-minted PKCE (Bitwarden web-vault mints its own verifier against /identity/connect/authorize and calls /api/sso/prevalidate first). ⚠ asserted in-repo, never measured; not deployed on either estate
miniocheck 2POST-only/JSON login-strategy endpoint. ⚠ the measurement is STALE: it was taken against the old embedded console, and SHC now ships a third-party community fork sidecar (georgmangold/console) whose OIDC flow the package itself says is “NOT yet live-verified against a Keycloak” (apps/storage/minio/compose.yaml:126-127)
sonarqubecheck 5passes checks 1-4 (/sessions/new?sso=false → 200 with the local form) but logout lands on /sessions/new with no distinguishing key, and Community Build has no SAML SLO → infinite re-login. A documented refusal, pinned at sso_redirect_audit_test.go:200-259
highlightcheck 1 + cross-hostSPA shell with no server-visible login path, and the cross-host class below

The cross-host class: one instance, not a pattern

Section titled “The cross-host class: one instance, not a pattern”

ce builds the redirect target from each route’s own host, by design: resolvePath strips any scheme+host from a declared sso_start: (ce/modules/app/sso_redirect.go:319-329) and ssoRedirectReplacement(rt.Host, ssoStart) re-attaches this route’s origin (:498-506, :555-560). The intent is written into the file at :29-39 and pinned by TestEachHostRedirectsToItsOwnOrigin (sso_redirect_test.go:118-140): a multi-host service must never bounce a visitor cross-origin mid-login. So an app whose login page is on one host and whose SSO start is on another cannot have a redirect built for it.

highlight is such an app: login page on highlight-frontend, OIDC start /private/oauth/login on highlight-backend (apps/enterprise/highlight/compose.yaml:86-88; oidc.plug.yaml:8-9 pins the plug to highlight-backend alone).

dependency-track is NOT the second instance; checked, and the answer is no. The “two hosts sbom and sbom-api” premise is stale. At HEAD dependency-track is one hostname, path-routed; the ingress contract is written into apps/security/dependency-track/app.yaml:42-108 (”★ INGRESS CONTRACT: ONE HOSTNAME, TWO SERVICES, PATH-ROUTED”), the frontend owns the entire browser auth surface including /static/oidc-callback.html (:88-91), and TestDependencyTrackOIDCCallbackStaysOnTheFrontend (tests/unit/catalog/dtrack_single_host_test.go:378-381) pins it. Its refusal is browser-minted PKCE, above.

Recommendation: do not build a cross-host mechanism. The class has one live member (highlight), which is separately ruled out of the errors league on the paid-SSO axis (docs/decisions/2026-08-06-flagship-tier.md:280); its OIDC auth mode is license-gated upstream, so a mechanism built for it buys an app the estate has decided not to run. One dormant member exists, blockscout, whose ACCOUNT_KEYCLOAK_* support arrives only at backend v10.1.0 while the pin is 9.0.2, worth watching on a bump, not worth pre-building for. matrix is structurally cross-host but has a native knob and never needs the router.

The cheaper fix already exists and has already been applied once: consolidate onto one hostname with path prefixes, which ce handles natively and which dependency-track has already done.

★ One defect worth fixing regardless of the above. A cross-host declaration fails silently. A packager who writes sso_start: "{{ url('other-service') }}/oauth/login" gets no warning; resolvePath quietly discards the origin and the router 302s to https://<this-route's-host>/oauth/login, which 404s. The only refusals ssoRedirectRouter emits are loginPath == ssoStart and an unrenderable rule pattern. Recommend a lint check that refuses a sso_start: templating a different service than the route it lands on.


5. Pre-flight: two cleanups that must land in the same change

Section titled “5. Pre-flight: two cleanups that must land in the same change”

Neither is optional; both were found in the 2026-08-10 live audit and neither has been touched.

  1. ★ Delete zz-ssoedge.yaml on bitspur, in the same change that arms the key. It is a hand-written Traefik dynamic file arming nextcloud (cloud.corp.bitspur.com, ^/login/?$, priority 90000). Its own header says it exists because the catalogue nextcloud does not declare sso_redirect:, and that it must be deleted once ssoAutoRedirect is set; otherwise the two duplicate. Nextcloud is a bucket-A app whose knob is applied from a consumer plug job, so a global flip does trigger this condition. Today there is exactly one router and no duplication; arming without deleting creates two.

  2. Reconcile the affine-rs split rows. Both estates carry ssoAutoRedirect false at stack scope and true at deployment scope. Deployment wins so it resolves true today, but the pair reads like a half-finished edit, and the next operator to delete the deployment row silently disarms it. A global true does not change the resolution (deployment still wins), but it makes the stray false actively misleading. Remove the stack row: shc config set ssoAutoRedirect! -t corp -s affine-rs --scope stack.

Also worth clearing while in there, though inert: corp/affine is armed on both estates and serves nothing (down on bitspur; an orphan /var/lib/shc/deployments/corp/affine directory on promanager, not in shc ls).


Arm bucket A, both estates (run once per estate, on the estate’s node, against unix:/run/shc/shc.sock):

Terminal window
# pre-flight 1, bitspur only
sudo rm /var/lib/shc/system/traefik/dynamic/zz-ssoedge.yaml
# pre-flight 2, both estates
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect! -t corp -s affine-rs --scope stack
# the arming decision itself
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect true --scope global

Global scope is the right tier because the resolution ladder is deployment > stack > environment > tenant > global: a global row is the weakest, so every existing stack/deployment row (all of which already say true, bar the affine-rs stray) keeps winning, and any future exemption is a narrower row rather than an edit to this one.

Exempt one deployment (this is the only correct way; a false var is indistinguishable from an unset one):

Terminal window
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect false -t corp -s <stack> -e prod --scope deployment

Rollback. Two forms, and the difference matters:

Terminal window
# preferred: delete the global row, falling back to the packaged default (false)
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect! --scope global
# or pin it off explicitly
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect false --scope global

★ A removal deletes the row at exactly one tier (the one set with the same flags would have written) and nothing else (ce/modules/config/commands/set.go:29-60). It is the exact inverse of the set, deliberately not “make this key go away”. So the rollback above removes only the global row; every pre-existing stack/deployment true survives it, which is what you want; rollback should restore the state before the flip, not disarm apps that were armed on purpose beforehand.

No redeploy is required. ce re-resolves the flag every ingress sweep, and the compose surface re-renders on the next update. For the native-knob half (bucket A1) the template value only changes on the next deploy of that app, so a bucket-A1 app already running will pick it up at its next shc update.

Verification after arming (read-only, per the audit’s own recipe):

Terminal window
sudo grep -n 'rule:\|loginPattern\|ssoSelector\|redirectRegex' \
/var/lib/shc/system/traefik/dynamic/ingress-*.yaml
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' https://<host>/<login-path>
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'https://<host>/<login-path>?sso=false'

7. Cross-site hosts: a correction, and why they are a different risk

Section titled “7. Cross-site hosts: a correction, and why they are a different risk”

A host whose registrable domain differs from the estate’s primary is cross-site relative to auth.corp.<primary>. That matters here because the launcher’s silent check and the post-logout behaviour both differ cross-site (it is exactly the case the cross-site click-through fallback was built for), and because each such host carries its own DNS zone and its own certificate, so an ACME/renewal failure can hit it without touching any corp.* host.

★ git.corp.promanager.online does not exist. The string promanager.online appears in no file on this box. The GitLab host on that estate is git.corp.promanager.vip, same registrable domain as the estate primary, therefore same-site, and not a cross-site case at all. The promanager estate’s DNS connection carries zones = ["promanager.vip"] (promanager-ops/hetzner/hel1/infra/main.tf:474), one zone only, so it cannot currently serve a cross-site host.

estateprimarycross-site hosts
promanagerpromanager.vip (.gitlab-ci.yml:124)none
bitspurbitspur.com (.gitlab-ci.yml:78)two

bitspur’s zones = ["bitspur.com", "selfhostedcloud.org", "flyingfoxlabs.in"] (bitspur-ops/hetzner/hel1/infra/main.tf:353) is the structural enabler of both:

  • ★ hq.flyingfoxlabs.in: frappe, stack ffx, SSO-bound to bitspur’s Keycloak, already armed at deployment scope and live-measured working. It is the canonical cross-site case in the code (shc/traefik/plugin/launcher_crosssite_test.go:47) and the named reason a parent-domain launcher cookie was refused (traefik/plugin/launcher.go:38). It is declared in no file anywhere, a CLI-created deployment from the k8s→SHC restore whose only file-level lever is that one string in zones. A customer’s domain, on bitspur’s Traefik, with its lifecycle in CLI history: the single highest-leverage undocumented dependency in either estate, and worth declaring in the ops repo independent of this plan.
  • license.selfhostedcloud.org: license-broker. No OIDC by design (gated = false; /activate is a machine API with no browser session), so it is out of scope for arming. Note it is the one host pinned to acme_provider = "prod", and its URL is baked into every released shc binary from v0.0.12, a frozen consumer contract.

Implication for arming: the only cross-site host that this flip touches is hq.flyingfoxlabs.in, and it is already armed and already working. The global flip does not change its resolution (its deployment row wins). No new cross-site exposure is created by this decision.


bucketcountwhat the flip does
A: safe to arm16 packages: 11 native-knob + 6 router, windmill being in both (5 live deployments newly affected: gitlab ×2, ciso-assistant ×2, nextcloud ×1)arms them; every one has a verified escape URL
B: no bypass5: gitea, wazuh, matrix, journiv, vaultwardenstrict no-op, enforced by a differential render test
C: cannot6: penpot, dependency-track, vaultwarden, minio, sonarqube, highlightstrict no-op; no mechanism exists

Recommended: yes to §6 on both estates, with the two §5 pre-flights in the same change, and wordpress pinned off at stack scope until its JS-stripped bypass is fixed.

Deferred to a separate, explicitly-consented decision: bucket B, one named deployment at a time.

Recommended not to build: a cross-host redirect mechanism. One live member, itself already ruled out on the payment axis. Build the silent- misdeclaration lint (§4) instead.


9. The native-knob tier: which surface arms it, and the two that must not be armed

Section titled “9. The native-knob tier: which surface arms it, and the two that must not be armed”

Added 2026-08-11 after walking every native-knob package that ships its knob OFF: paperless, immich, midpoint, midpoint-classic, wordpress, defectdojo-classic. All six were already wired to the fleet-wide surface by 59ecac10f; the open question was whether any of them should be armed in the CATALOGUE rather than on an estate.

9.1 There are three surfaces, and only one of them is an estate decision

Section titled “9.1 There are three surfaces, and only one of them is an estate decision”
surfacewhere it livescan a scoped row turn it back off?
vars.keycloak.<knob>the package’s vars.yamlno
app.yaml sso_auto_redirect:the package’s app.yamlyes; a scoped row overrides it outright
ssoAutoRedirect config rowthe estate’s dqliteyes; it is the row

★ A vars.yaml default of true would be UNEXEMPTABLE, and that is a stronger objection than “it changes behaviour”. The two surfaces are additive (vars.<knob> or sso_auto_redirect), so a packaged true arms the var leg on every install and no config row at any scope can clear it; shc config set ssoAutoRedirect false --scope deployment would clear only the other leg. It is refused by TestNativeKnobDefaultsOffInVarsYaml and, for the makeDefault spelling, by TestChannelKnobDefaultsOffInVarsYaml.

★ The app.yaml sso_auto_redirect: field IS a real catalogue lever and it stays exemptable; ce resolves it as a DEFAULT that a scoped row beats (ce/modules/app/launcher.go, SSOAutoRedirectForAppDir: the scoped value returns if present, the app.yaml field is the fallback). It is still not used here, deliberately. ce’s own resolver states the design in as many words: “the app.yaml default is FALSE. The launcher is cosmetic and ships on; this changes where a login attempt lands, and an app whose IdP is misconfigured would send every visitor into a broken flow. It is opt-in, per deployment, by an operator who can see the IdP.” The failure mode it names is a misconfigured IdP, not an absent one, so the and integrations.oidc gate every one of these six carries does not cover it. A bound-but-broken Keycloak (wrong realm, rotated secret, expired cert) is exactly the case that strands a consumer of selfhostedcloud.org/apps whom this repo cannot see and cannot roll back for.

Conclusion: no catalogue default changes. Arming this tier is an estate action, per §6, on an estate whose IdP the operator can see.

Every row’s break-glass is package evidence, and every row’s knob was confirmed to emit a real navigation, not merely to hide a credential form (the force_sso/ssoOnly class, which fails the definition rather than a check).

AppKnobBreak-glassLogout (check 5)Guarded by
paperlessPAPERLESS_REDIRECT_LOGIN_TO_SSO/accounts/login/?loggedout=1✔ logout lands on the bypassTestNativeKnobRendersOnlyWhenArmed/paperless
immichOIDC_AUTO_LAUNCH → .oauth.autoLaunch/auth/login?autoLaunch=0✔awaitingBothLegsGuard (plug-job shape)
midpointkeycloak.makeDefault<base>/midpoint/auth/default✔TestChannelKnobMovesTheDefaultOnlyWhenArmed
midpoint-classickeycloak.makeDefault<base>/midpoint/auth/default✔same

★ midpoint’s two packages had no guard at all until this change, and no error either. They spell the knob keycloak.makeDefault, and TestEveryNativeKnobAppIsInThisTable swept vars.yaml for autoRedirect alone, so the ratchet whose entire job is to say “this app is unguarded” walked past both of them in silence. The sweep now covers every spelling (nativeKnobVarNames), and the mechanism itself is asserted on three legs plus the break-glass in sso_auto_redirect_channel_knob_test.go: arming moves the #user channel default and must not delete the admin-gui-default sequence or change its urlSuffix, because that surviving suffix is the whole recovery path. midpoint’s and midpoint-classic’s makeDefault descriptions named no bypass at all before this change; they do now.

wordpress: REFUSED. The break-glass is half a hatch. /wp-login.php?login-error=1 renders the page and then remove_login_form() deletes the credential form from the DOM in JavaScript (daggerhart-openid-connect-generic 3.11.3 login-form.php:85,197). Recovery therefore needs a browser with JS disabled. “Reaches a local credential form when the IdP is down” is the standard, and a form deleted on load does not meet it. The knob stays wired and stays off; if the fleet key is set globally, wordpress needs an explicit stack-scoped exemption (§9.4).

defectdojo-classic: REFUSED. Check 4 passes, check 5 fails, measured. /login?force_login_form genuinely reaches the form, so this is not the gitea/wazuh no-bypass class. But dojo/user/views.py:139-143 is logout(request) followed by return login_view(request) without the force_login_form marker, and 2.58.4 has no RP-initiated logout, so an armed deployment signs the user straight back in off the live Keycloak session. Arming it ships an app that cannot be signed out of. Same exemption.

Both refusals were already written into the packages’ own app.yaml var descriptions and into nativeKnobs’ evidence comments; §9.3 is where the decision that follows from them is recorded.

9.4 The exact commands: estate-side, NOT applied by this change

Section titled “9.4 The exact commands: estate-side, NOT applied by this change”

Run on each estate’s node, against unix:/run/shc/shc.sock. Verify first, because the resolution ladder means a pre-existing narrower row wins:

Terminal window
# what is set today, at every scope
shc config ls -o json | grep -A2 ssoAutoRedirect
# nothing printed = no row anywhere = the packaged default (false) is in force

Arming the tier is the §6 global flip; these apps need no per-app row. What they need is the exemptions and a redeploy:

Terminal window
# the two refusals: set BEFORE the global flip, so they are never armed at all
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect false -t <tenant> -s wordpress --scope stack
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect false -t <tenant> -s defectdojo-classic --scope stack
# the arming decision itself (§6)
shc config set ssoAutoRedirect true --scope global
# native knobs are TEMPLATE values: an already-running deployment picks the
# new render up on its next update, not on the next ingress sweep.
shc update -t <tenant> -s <stack> -e <env>

To undo, remove the row rather than pinning it off; a removal deletes exactly the tier it names and leaves every deliberate narrower row standing:

Terminal window
shc config unset ssoAutoRedirect --scope global

★ §6 spells the removal shc config set ssoAutoRedirect! --scope global. The subcommand in the shipped CLI is shc config unset <key> --scope <scope>; use that.

None of the six is deployed on either estate as of the 2026-08-10 audit, so the blast radius of the flip on this tier is future installs plus whatever shc ls --all-tenants shows at the time it is run. Confirm that before running it; the audit is a snapshot, not a lock.