shc / arch / exposure-ladder ← lab docs

Who can reach my app?

An shc install sets two independent dials: access (open by default, --gated) and exposure (lan by default, --public). They do not stack into a ladder: every one of the four cells below is legal. The request path never changes; only the place a request dies moves. Drag an origin along its wire toward the app: it stops where this posture stops it.

posture access=open exposure=lan tls: shc leaf
Request path: an off-network client resolving through public DNS, a LAN client, and a caller already on the node, all converging on Traefik, the shc-oidc gate and the app container Three draggable request origins converge on one path. An off-network client must first resolve the hostname in public DNS; when exposure is lan there is no public record and the request dies at name resolution, not at a packet filter, with no HTTP status at all. A LAN client reaches Traefik directly. A caller who already has a route to the node (the plainest case being one already on the node) sends the right Host header, skips DNS entirely and still reaches Traefik regardless of exposure. Past Traefik, gated deployments meet the shc-oidc forward-auth checkpoint backed by Keycloak, which answers 401 without a session, before the app container. internet lan node · shc your edge · no packet filter client off-network public dns lan fallback client on-lan any caller already on the node sends Host: traefik file router Host(`…`) keycloak ungated · /auth shc-oidc forward-auth not chained nextcloud container :80 no public record no http status: never left the resolver session required 401
off-net
on lan
on node
posture · pick a cell 0 / 3 origins sent
●what this cell installs shc cli

simulated Mirrors internal/modules/app/inject_traefik.go, internal/modules/app/dns_target.go, internal/modules/app/commands/install.go and forward-auth/cmd/forward-auth/main.go. No live cluster; packet timing is illustrative.
The honest part: exposure is not a firewall; SHC installs no iptables or nftables rule for it. What --public changes is the managed-DNS target and the cert posture. exposure=internet points the record at the Traefik node's public_address and fails closed (X200980DNSDEF, record deferred) rather than ever publishing an RFC1918 address; other exposures keep the LAN fallback: the Traefik node's internal address, else the publishing nodes. That is why the off-network request dies at the name layer above, and why the faint any caller path still arrives: anyone who already has a route to the node and sends the right Host header reaches the router regardless of exposure.
Two axes, not a ladder: --gated and --open are mutually exclusive (MarkFlagsMutuallyExclusive("gated","open")) and open is the default; --public is independent of both, which is why all four cells above are legal. --public raises exposure only; it never skips the SSO gate. The ungated warning (ShouldWarnUngated → X200950APPUGW) fires on access=open plus self_auth: false and does not read exposure at all, so a LAN-only open app warns too.
Ingress exists only when --expose is passed; with no --expose there is no Traefik router at all. Docs: docs.